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Progress in the Victim Reform
Movement: No Longer the
"Forgotten Victim"
David L. Roland*
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, crime victims have been forgotten in the criminal jus-
tice system. The system, as it evolved, protected the rights of the ac-
cused with zeal, while ignoring the victim's plight.' In addition to the
physical, financial, and emotional trauma caused by the crime itself,
the victim often was forced to endure repeated and prolonged ques-
tioning, intimidating threats by the accused or his associates, igno-
rance concerning the status or outcome of the proceeding, lost
property or wages, and lack of emotional, financial, and legal
support.2
In the last two decades, however, there has been an increased pub-
* Associate, Gardere & Wynne, Dallas, Texas; J.D., St. Mary's University, 1987;
B.B.A., University of Houston, 1983.
Research for this article was supported in part through Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD). However, the views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
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1. Perhaps the principal reason that defendants' rights have progressed at a
faster pace and received more attention than victims' rights is that the United States
Constitution specifically recognizes and protects rights of the criminally accused. See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VI. In contrast, rights of victims are not specifically protected
by the Constitution. See infra notes 12-14 and accompanying text.
2. McDonald, Criminal Justice and the Victim: An Introduction, in CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE VICTIM 17, 19-27 (W. McDonald ed. 1976); P. FINN & B. LEE, SERVING
CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES 1-2 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep't of Justice 1987).
In his 1987 Victims of Crime Week Proclamation, President Reagan focused on the dis-
couraging plight of the victim:
Crime-of any kind-can have a devastating impact on innocent victims and
their families. Besides the immediate physical and financial injuries, criminal
deeds exact an emotional toll from their victims that can deprive them of
their health, their sense of security and control, and even their basic trust in
others, the core of our social contract. Many victims desperately and futilely
search for the reason a criminal chose them as prey. When they turn to the
lic awareness of the crime victim's problems and needs. By 1980, nu-
merous organizations were advocating and implementing victim
assistance programs.3 In 1981, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed
the week of April 19th "National Victims' Rights Week."4 The grow-
ing concern for victims' rights, commonly referred to as the "victims'
movement," also prompted President Reagan to establish the Presi-
dent's Task Force on Victims of Crime to examine problems con-
fronted by victims and to suggest improvements in the treatment of
victims. 5 In December 1982, the Task Force published its report
which included specific proposals that would further the interests of
victims and help alleviate the problems encountered by victims when
confronting the criminal justice system.6
During the same year, Congress passed the Federal Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 19827 which, among other things, provided
for victim restitution, use of victim impact statements at sentencing
in federal cases, and victim and witness protection. Two years later,
Congress passed the Victims of Crime Act of 1984,8 which established
a victim compensation account funded by fines assessed in federal
criminal convictions. As a result of the need for a continuation of
these unprecedented achievements in the area of victims' rights, the
United States Department of Justice granted funds to the Criminal
Justice Section of the American Bar Association to commission a se-
ries of articles on victims' rights.9 Those articles, written by distin-
wider community for solace and support, they are often ignored, treated in-
sensitively, or, worst of all, blamed for their plight.
Proclamation No. 5638, 3 C.F.R. 50 (1987). For an extensive discussion of the role of
the victim through a historical perspective, see S. SCHAFER, VICTIMOLOGY: THE VICTIM
AND His CRIMINAL 5-29 (1977).
3. Examples of victim assistance programs include: National Organization for
Victims Assistance (NOVA), Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, Na-
tional Victims of Crime, and Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD).
4. Proclamation No. 4831, 3 C.F.R. 18 (1982). The President has proclaimed a
Crime Victims Week annually since 1981. See, e.g., Proclamation No. 5797, 53 Fed. Reg.
13,094 (1988); Proclamation No. 5638, 3 C.F.R. 50-51 (1987).
5. The members of the Task Force included: Lois Haight Herrington, Garfield
Bobo, Frank Carrington, James P. Damos, Doris L. Dolan, Kenneth 0. Eikenberry,
Robert J. Miller, Pat Robertson, and Stanton E. Samenow. See PRESIDENT'S TASK
FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME, FINAL REPORT (1982) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
6. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5.
7. Victim and Witness Protection Act of t982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248
(1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § ,512-1515, 3579-3580 (Supp. IV 1986) and
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)). See generally M*rritt, Corrections Law Developments: Res-
titution Under the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 44
(1984).
8. Victims of Crime Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604 (Supp. IV 1986). The
fund, known as the Crime Victims Fund, is used to compensate victims of federal
crimes and to provide assistance for eligible state victim compensation programs and
public and private victim assistance organizations. See inkfra notes 44-51 and accompa-
nying text.
9. Carrington & Nicholson, The Victims' Movement: An Idea Whose Time Has
Come, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 10-12 (Symposium 1984).
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guished scholars in the field, were published in 1984 by the
Pepperdine University School of Law in a special symposium edition
of the Pepperdine Law Review.1 0 The articles were intended to pres-
ent "a comprehensive overview of the law as it currently applies to
crime victims' rights, and perhaps to give a preview of possible future
developments in the law.""
Significant progress has been made in the victims' movement since
the symposium issue was published in 1984. The purpose of this arti-
cle is to present a brief survey of the current law governing victims'
rights, concentrating principally on state law. The article also will
summarize the major progressions of the victims' movement in a va-
riety of areas.
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM MEASURES
A. United States Constitutional Amendment
In its 1982 report, the President's Task Force recommended that
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution be amended
to guarantee victims "the right to be present and to be heard at all
critical stages of [criminal] judicial proceedings"12 To date, however,
such a constitutional amendment has not been enacted. Further-
more, in January 1986, the National Organization for Victim Assist-
ance (NOVA) held a conference on the Task Force's recommended
amendment. The. participants of the conference proposed an alterna-
10. See Victims' Rights Symposium, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1 (Symposium 1984).
The commissioned articles include: Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government
Responsibility and the Right Not to be a Victim, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 63 (Sympo-
sium 1984); Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 9; Gittler, Expanding the Role of the
Victim in a Criminal Action: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 117 (Symposium 1984); Hudson, The Crime Victim and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem: Time For A Change, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 23 (Symposium 1984); Kelly, Victims'
Perceptions of Criminal Justice, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 15 (Symposium 1984).
11. Carrington & Nicholson, supra note 9, at 10.
12. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 114. The task force recommended that the
sixth amendment be amended to read as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense. Likewise, the victim, in every criminal prosecution shall have the
right to be present and to be heard at all critical stages of judicial proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added). For an extensive analysis of the task force proposal, see Lam-
born, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice Process: The Proposals for a Con-
stitutional Amendment, 34 WAYNE L. REV. 125, 172-200 (1987).
tive constitutional amendment, but elected not to endorse either ver-
sion. 13 The participants, however, approved a statement urging
members of the federal legislature to introduce legislative resolutions
on the issue and to call for subcommittee hearings to study the
proposals.14
B. State Constitutional Amendments
Although efforts to pass an amendment to the United States Con-
stitution have been previously unsuccessful, advocates of the victims'
rights movement have realized better results by proposing amend-
ments to state constitutions. In 1982, California became the first
state to amend its constitution to expressly recognize victims'
rights.15 The amendment, enacted by initiative, specifically provides
for a victim's right to restitution,16 safe schools,17 consideration of
13. See NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE, VICTIM RIGHTS AND
SERVICES: A LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY 8 (1987) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY].
The conference participants proposed a twenty-seventh amendment to the
Constitution:
Victims of crime are entitled to certain basic rights, including but not limited
to the right to be informed, to be present, and to be heard at all critical stages
of the federal and state criminal justice process to the extent that these rights
do not interfere with existing Constitutional rights.
10 NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE NEWSLETTER 7 (Mar. 1986) [here-
inafter VICTIM ASSISTANCE NEWSLETTER].
14. VICTIM ASSISTANCE NEWSLETTER, supra note 13, at 7. The statement read as
follows:
First, having met for two days among ourselves and Congressional Represent-
atives and Aides, we have determined that the time has come for the United
States Congress to initiate a Constitutional amendment adopting the princi-
ples of the amendment proposed by the President's Task Force on Victims of
Crime.
Second, we believe that those principles embody the concept of victim partici-
pation in all critical stages of the criminal justice process.
Third, we believe that participants of this conference should urge members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives to introduce appropriate legisla-
tive resolutions and to call for hearings of the appropriate subcommittees of
the House and Senate on this issue.
And fourth, having considered the language of both the President's Task
Force Report and a recommended alternative, we believe that through the
course of hearings, an appropriately-worded amendment can be obtained.
Id
A third proposal for a constitutional amendment was recommended by the Victims'
Constitutional Amendment Network (Victims' CAN). As of May 1987, the Victims'
CAN proposal read as follows:
Victims of crime are entitled to certain basic rights, including the right to be
informed of, to be present at, and to be heard at all critical stages of the crimi-
nal justice process, to the extent that these rights do not interfere with the
constitutional rights of the accused. The Legislature is authorized to enforce
the amendment by appropriate enabling legislation.
2 SUNNY VON BULow NATIONAL VICTIM ADVOCACY CENTER, NETWORKS 8 (May 1987).
15. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; see Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274,
186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982) (upholding constitutionality of amendment).
16. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b).
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public safety when setting bail,18 and unrestricted admissibility of
prior felony convictions.19 Perhaps most importantly, the California
amendment also provides the victim with the absolute right to appear
at sentencing and parole proceedings.
The State legislature in Rhode Island recently voted to amend that
state's constitution to include the rights of victims of crime as
follows:
A victim of crime shall, as a matter of right, be treated by agents of the state
with dignity, respect and sensitivity during all phases of the criminal justice
process. Such person shall be entitled to receive, from the perpetrator of the
crime, financial compensation for any injury or loss caused by the perpetrator
of the crime, and shall receive such other compensation as the state may pro-
vide. Before sentencing, a victim shall have the right to address the court re-
garding the impact which the perpetrator's conduct has had upon the
victim. 2
0
In addition, Arizona legislators have recently proposed an amend-
ment to the state constitution which would give a victim the right to
be (1) present at all public proceedings in the case; (2) heard at sen-
tencing and parole proceedings; (3) notified, upon request, of the sta-
tus and disposition of the case; and (4) notified, upon request, when
the accused or convicted person in a felony case involving violence is
released from custody or has escaped.21
Also, legislators in Delaware have proposed a state constitutional
amendment which would add the following language: "Victims of
crime are entitled to certain basic rights, including the right to be in-
formed of, to be present at, and to be heard at all critical stages of the
criminal justice process, to the extent that those rights do not inter-
fere with the constitutional rights of the accused."22
A successful proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution recently
gave crime victims the right to: (1) be treated with fairness and re-
spect throughout the criminal justice process; (2) timely disposition
of the case following arrest of the accused; (3) be reasonably pro-
tected from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; (4)
notification of court proceedings; (5) attend the trial and all other
court proceedings; (6) confer with the prosecution; (7) make a state-
17. Id, § 28(c).
18. Id § 28(e).
19. Id § 28(f).
20. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 23.
21. Lamborn, supra note 12, at 133 n.41; see generally New Track for Victims'
Rights, 74 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1988, at 32 (discussing proposed Arizona amendment, in-
cluding proposal for victim restitution).
22. Del. S. 266, 134th Gen. Ass. (1987).
ment to the court at sentencing; (8) restitution; and (9) information
about the conviction, sentence, imprisonment, and release of the
accused. 23
Furthermore, in November 1989, voters in Washington approved
the following state constitutional amendment:
A victim of crime, or the victim's representative, shall have the right to be in-
formed of, to be present at, and to be heard at all criminal judicial proceedings
at which the defendant has such rights, subject to the same rules of procedure
which govern the defendant's rights. This provision shall not constitute a ba-
sis for error in favor of the defendant in a criminal proceeding.2 4
In February 1987, several organizations formed a coalition called
the Victims' Constitutional Amendment Network (Victims' CAN).25
The principal purpose of Victims' CAN is to promote passage of state
constitutional amendments implementing rights for victims.
C. State Legislative and Judicial Changes
1. Victims' Bill of Rights
"Victims' bill of rights" generally refers to state legislation that
comprehensively focuses on the rights of victims to participate in the
criminal justice process. The Wisconsin legislature enacted the first
bill of rights for victims in 1979.26 In the last eight years, approxi-
mately forty-four states have enacted similar statutes.27 The major-
ity of these statutes address issues such as victim notification, victim
impact statements, victim participation in court proceedings, speedy
23. Mich. H.J. Res. P, 84th Reg. Sess. (1988).
24. Wash. S.J. Res. 8228, 50th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1988). A similar proposal was ap-
proved by the voters in Texas on the same day. See generally 4 NATIONAL VICTIM
CENTER, NETWORKS 1 (Sept. 1989).
In May 1987, Florida legislators approved the following proposed amendment to the
state constitution:
Victims of crime or their lawful representatives, including the next of kin of
homicide victims, are entitled to the right to be informed, to be present, and
to be heard when relevant, at all crucial stages of criminal proceedings, to the
extent that these rights do not interfere with the constitutional rights of the
accused.
1987 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. No. 4, A-i, A-2 (West). The proposal was approved by voters
in the November 1988 general election. Legislators in Maryland and Ohio also pro-
posed constitutional amendments in 1989. 4 NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER, NETWORKS 1
(Sept. 1989).
25. The coalition originally was formed by members of NOVA's Task Force on
Victims. 1 SUNNY VON BULOw NATIONAL VICTIM ADVOCACY CENTER, NETWORKS 1
(Oct. 1986). The coalition initially was named the Constitutional Amendment Steering
Committee. Id, The Victims' CAN coalition currently includes representatives from,
among others, NOVA, Sunny Von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, National
Center for Missing and Exploited Children, MADD, Childhelp USA, Parents of Mur-
dered Children, Protect the Innocent Victims Advocate Foundation, Justice for Surviv-
ing Victims, Justice for Crime Victims of America, Victims of Crime Advocacy League,
and the Crime Victims Committee of the American Bar Association.
26. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 950 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
27. See LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 6-7. Victims' bill of rights legis-
lation is currently pending in Arizona and Hawaii. Id. at 6.
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disposition of cases, protection from intimidation, employer and cred-
itor intercession, and information concerning social services.
Victims' bill of rights statutes are most often criticized for failing to
include express enforcement mechanisms. For example, the Massa-
chusetts' statute provides that victims shall have the rights enumer-
ated in the statute only "[t]o the extent possible and subject to the
available resources." 28 Similarly, the victims' bill of rights enacted in
Washington requires only a "reasonable effort" by criminal justice
agencies to protect victims' rights under the statute.29 Furthermore,
most victims' bill of rights statutes include a provision which protects
a state from litigation initiated by victims arising out of inadequate
statutory enforcement. For example, the Michigan statute provides:
"[N]othing in this [statute] shall be construed as creating a cause of
action for money damages against the state, a county, a municipality
or any of their agencies, or instrumentalities, or employees."3o Thus,
the statutes are difficult to enforce and, in effect, are merely guide-
lines for courts and other criminal justice agencies.
2. Victim Restitution
"Victim restitution" generally refers to the court-ordered payment
of money or services by a person convicted of a crime as compensa-
tion for losses suffered by the victim.3 1 Restitution has a long and
extensive history in the American judicial system, including its fre-
quent use as a criminal sanction in America during the colonial pe-
riod.32 References to the concept of restitution have even been found
among the ancient codes of some of the earliest civilizations, includ-
ing the Code of Hammurabi and early Mosaic law.33 By the 1950s,
28. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258B, § 3 (West 1988).
29. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69.030 (Supp. 1989).
30. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.773 (West Supp. 1988). Similarly, a Texas stat-
ute states that "[a] judge, attorney for the state, peace officer, or law enforcement
agency is not liable for a failure or inability to provide a right enumerated in [the Vic-
tims' Bill of Rights statute]." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.02(d) (Vernon Supp.
1988).
31. See Gittler, supra note 10, at 132. See generally RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE- (J. Hudson ed. 1975) (collection of papers presented at the First International
Symposium on Restitution).
32. See generally Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, re-
printed in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 31, at 34.
33. Id. The extensive history of the concept of restitution led one commentator to
state that "[restitution] to victims of crime is as old as civilization." Childres, Compen-
sation for Criminally Inflicted Personal Injury, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 444, 444 (1964); see
also Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and an Analysis of Its
Present Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 71-80 (1970).
however, restitution had become an almost forgotten remedy in the
American criminal justice system.3 4 In recent years, the remedy
of court-ordered restitution in criminal cases has been rediscovered
by jurists. In view of the highly-publicized problems of the over-
crowded and costly prison system, restitution is perceived by many
commentators and jurists as an effective alternative to
incarceration.3 5
Nevertheless, there are drawbacks to the use of restitution as a
remedy in the criminal justice system. The principal disadvantage is
that the criminal must first be apprehended and convicted before the
victim can recover. Second, a significant percentage of criminal de-
fendants are indigent. Notwithstanding these flaws, a 1983 study esti-
mated that victims would recover an annual sum in excess of $150
million through restitution.36
Although legislators in every state have enacted statutes that pro-
vide restitution for crime victims, these statutes have relatively little
impact. Because the restitution remedy is grounded in ancient com-
mon law principles, judges hearing criminal cases always have had
the authority to render sanctions involving restitution. Thus, the
lack of progress in providing restitution for crime victims directly re-
sults from the failure of the criminal justice system to exercise resti-
tution as a remedy, rather than the lack of its availability.
Currently, twenty-six state statutes require a judge in a criminal
case to order restitution unless sufficient cause exists not to issue
such an order.37 Federal statutes mandate that the judge in such a
34. The establishment of penitentiaries in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries has frequently been cited as the predominant cause of the decline of
restitution as a criminal sanction. See, e.g., Gittler, supra note 10, at 133. But see D.
ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW
REPUBLIC 61-62 (1971) (asserting that post-revolutionary penal and correctional reform
movement was principal factor in utilization of incarceration rather than restitution).
35. See, e.g., Newton, Alternatives to Imprisonment: Day Fines, Community Ser-
vice Orders, and Restitution, 8 CRIME & DELINQUENCY LITERATURE 109 (1976); see also
People v. Williams, 57 Mich. App. 439, 225 N.W.2d 798, 799 (1975) (requirement of vic-
tims' restitution as a condition to defendant's probation did not violate constitutional
rights); Commonwealth v. Walton, 483 Pa. 588, 598-99, 397 A.2d 1179, 1184-85 (1979)
(trial court had discretion to require restitution payment as a condition of defendant's
probation).
36. Hudson, supra note 10, tt 46 (citing NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIMS BOARD,
ESTIMATES OF POTENTIAL VICTIM RECOVERIES FROM RESTITUTION IN NEW YORK STATE
(1983)).
37. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b); ALA. CODE § 15-18-67 (1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-603(c) (1989); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-90-303 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-28-
101 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4106 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(b) (West
1985 & Supp. 1989); HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-605(1)(d) (Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 19-
5304(3) (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 910.2 (West Supp. 1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
4610(4) (1981); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.200 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895.1 (West Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1323(1)
(Supp. 1989); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.766(3) (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-101(3), (6) (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 176.189(3) (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN.
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case order restitution unless the judge renders a written statement
justifying the decision not to issue the order.38 Such statutes, how-
ever, generally do not require the judge to issue a nondiscretionary
restitution order in every case in which the victim suffers a monetary
loss.3 9 Further, the majority of statutes do not provide mechanisms
for the enforcement of restitution orders.40
3. Victim Compensation
Victim compensation programs are governmental services that pro-
vide for the reimbursement of certain costs incurred by victims as a
result of crime. Compensation is different than restitution because
victims are compensated by the government, rather than the crimi-
nal, and the compensation is provided regardless of whether the
criminal is apprehended or convicted. As of 1988, forty-four states
had enacted victim compensation plans.41 The significant progress in
recent years, however, has not increased the number of available
compensation programs, but only has extended the coverage of ex-
isting programs.
Prior to 1984, state compensation programs were collectively in a
dismal condition. Most programs were insufficiently funded and
awarded limited amounts of benefits.42 In addition, the plans were
ineffective because they placed substantial restrictions on probable
§ 31-17-1(B) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-08 (Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-
1530(d) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-28-3 (1988); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-201(3)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7043(f) (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.120(14) (Supp. 1989); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-4(a) (1989).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(2) (1982). For a general overview of the restitu-
tion provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act, see W. WELD, RESTITUTION
PURSUANT To THE VICTIM AND WITNESS PROTECTION ACT (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1987).
39. But see, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (mandates restitution in any case in
which loss occurs).
40. But see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3579(h) (1982) (victim has right to enforce restitution
order issued by federal court "in same manner as a judgment in civil action"). In addi-
tion, victims generally do not have the right to appeal an inadequate restitution order.
See United States v. Franklin, 792 F.2d 998 (11th Cir. 1986) (victim's appeal dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction).
41. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 1. In addition, the District of Co-
lumbia and the Virgin Islands have established compensation plans. Id. As of 1988,
the six states that had not yet enacted compensation programs were Georgia, Maine,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Vermont. Id. at 2. See generally
Smith, Victim Compensation: Hard Questions and Suggested Remedies, 17 RUTGERS
L.J. 51 (1985) (discussing problems of victim compensation programs).
42. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT OF 1984: A REPORT TO
CONGRESS BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 20 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS].
According to a 1983 survey, over 50% of the existing compensation programs reported
compensation candidates and forced eligible victims to wait months,
or even years, before claims were paid.43
The enactment of the Victims of Crime Act of 198444 (VOCA) was
a major catalyst in improving compensation programs. VOCA estab-
lished a Crime Victims' Fund, a substantial part of which provides
grants to "eligible" state victim compensation programs.4 5 In order
to become eligible for VOCA funding, the state plans must:
(a) offer compensation to victims of crime and survivors of crime victims for
medical expenses, including mental health counseling, loss of wages, and
funeral expenses;
4 6
(b) promote cooperation with the reasonable requests of law enforcement
authorities;
4 7
(c) not use grants to supplant state funds otherwise available for crime vic-
tims' compensation;
4 8
(d) compensate nonresident victims on the same basis as resident victims; 4 9
(e) compensate victims of federal crimes on the same basis as victims of state
crimes;5 0 and
(f) provide any information regarding the program as required by the Attor-
ney General. 5
1
To date, all but one state meets the VOCA grant eligibility stan-
dards, and many have exceeded the standards.52 For example, Colo-
rado's compensation program permits an award to be made to cover
problems of insufficient funding. D. McGILLIS & P. SMITH, COMPENSATING VICTIMS OF
CRIME: AN ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN PROGRAMS 190 (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1983).
43. In 1983, only 40% of existing victim compensation programs were able to pro-
cess compensation claims within four months. D. McGILLIS & P. SMITH, supra note 42,
at 190. Approximately 37% of the programs took over seven months to process a
claim, and 7% of the programs were not able to process a claim within one year. Id.
44. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2170 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1501, 1512, 3013, 3671, 3672 (Supp. V 1987) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10604 (Supp. IV
1986)).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b) (Supp. IV 1986). Of the first $100 million deposited
into the fund in any single fiscal year, up to 49.5% is available for grants to state com-
pensation programs. 42 U.S.C. § 10601(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). During the 1986 fiscal
year, approximately $31 million was available for state compensation program grants.
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 15. The remainder of the victims' fund is allo-
cated as follows: (a) 45% for grants to states for victim assistance; (b) 1% for training
and technical assistance grants to eligible victim assistance programs; and (c) 4.5% for
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment grants under the Children's Justice Act. 42
U.S.C. § 10601(d)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). The principal sources of revenue for the victims'
fund are federal criminal fines, proceeds of forfeited appearance bonds, bail bonds, and
collateral profits of crime, and proceeds of the sale of literary or other rights arising
out of criminal acts by federal defendants. See id. § 10601(b)(1); see also REPORT TO
CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 9.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 10602(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
47. Id. § 10602(b)(2).
48. Id. § 10602(b)(3).
49. Id. § 10602(b)(4).
50. Id. § 10602(b)(5).
51. Id. § 10602(b)(6).
52. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 2. Nevada's compensation plan still
bans nonresident victims from eligibility; thus, Nevada's plan is ineligible for the fed-
eral grant. Id.; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.220(d) (1987).
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broken doors, windows, and locks,53 while New York's plan allows
emergency payments for the replacement of indispensable personal
property54 such as glasses and hearing aids.
The progress in state compensation programs has not been limited
solely to the expansion of coverage. The average amount of each
award to victims also has grown at an equally dramatic pace. A re-
cent survey of twenty-eight states revealed that, between fiscal years
1985 and 1986, the total amounts awarded to crime victims rose from
$49,495,178 to $89,499,346.55 Perhaps the most startling rate of
growth occurred in West Virginia, where total victim compensation
awards rose from $182,000 to $1,762,000 between the fiscal years of
1985 and 1986-an increase of over 800%.56 The increased awards
most likely resulted from states raising their maximum award limits
for their compensation programs. Since 1985, a total of fifteen states
have raised their award limits. 57 Additionally, growth has taken
place in the number of victim compensation awards. In California,
for instance, the number of awards increased from 6,518 to 24,132 in a
one-year period.58 Nationwide, the total number of awards increased
approximately 108% between the fiscal years of 1985 and 1986.59
While much progress has been made in the area of victim compen-
sation, it is apparent that many state programs continue to be inade-
quate in several important respects. The utilization of the
"household exclusion" provision is perhaps the most glaring defi-
ciency in a large number of programs. This exclusion generally pro-
hibits recovery of compensation by persons who are victimized by
their own household or family members.60 Although the exclusion
was originally intended to safeguard against compensating the crimi-
53. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4.1-102(8.5) (1988).
54. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 630(2) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
55. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 24.
56. Id. at 24.
57. Id. at 32. For example, Wisconsin raised its maximum benefit level from
$10,000 to $40,000. Id. Although increases in maximum benefit levels display a definite
improvement in the compensation programs, such improvements will not adequately
benefit the average victim. In fiscal year 1986, the average award nationally was a
meager $1,864. Id. at 1. The average compensation award in cases involving crimes
such as murder usually will not exceed $8,000. Id. at 32.
58. Id. at 24.
59. Id. The number of awards increased from 21,590 in 1985 to 44,850 in 1986. Id.
60. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b)(1) (1987). The Maryland statute
states that "a person who is criminally responsible for the crime upon which a claim is
based or an accomplice of such person or a member of the family of such persons shall
not be eligible to receive an award with respect to [the compensation] claim." Id.
nal rather than the victim,61 the harsh impact of the exclusion is that
abused spouses and children are often barred from recovering
compensation. 62
Surprisingly, the household exclusion still exists in the majority of
state compensation programs. 63 Many states, however, have at-
tempted to minimize the severity of the exclusion's restrictions. As
of 1988, at least twelve states had amended the restriction to allow
waivers of the exclusion on a case-by-case basis.6 4 Also, five states
exclude abused children from the household restrictions.65 Never-
theless, as a whole, relatively little progress has occurred in changing
this unnecessary and unfair exemption.
A second exclusion typically found in the states' victim compensa-
tion plans prohibits compensating victims of automobile crashes
caused by drunk drivers. These "drunk driving exclusions" originally
were intended to protect the states' compensation funds against de-
pletion and possible bankruptcy.66 The fears of bankruptcy, however,
have proven to be unfounded. According to a study conducted by
61. H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, PUBLIC COMPENSATION To VICTIMS OF CRIME 269
(1974). Another rationale favoring the household exclusion is that a relatively high
number of crimes occur in a domestic setting; thus, eliminating claims by spouses or
children of offenders will greatly decrease the cost of the state's compensation pro-
gram. Id. One would assume, however, that the high frequency of domestic-related
crimes would strengthen the arguments against the exclusion. The goal of a compen-
sation program should be to aid as many needy victims as possible. To exclude a class
of victims merely because the class is proportionately large directly contravenes the
very purpose of the programs. Id. at 270.
62. The potential hardship associated with the household exclusion is illustrated
by the following case summary by the Maryland Criminal Injuries Compensation
Board:
Claim filed on behalf of the two infant claimants by their mother. Claimants'
mother was first wife of their father, the victim. Claimants' father was shot
and killed by his second wife, the infants' step-mother. Section 5(6)(b) and
2(d)(1) of Article 26A of the Maryland Annotated Code together exclude
members of the family of a person who is criminally responsible for a crime of
becoming eligible to receive an award under our statute. Since the infant
claimants are 'within the third degree of affinity to the assailant, we find the
infants not to be eligible to receive an award growing out of this claim. The
claim is, therefore, disallowed.
Id at 269 (citing MARYLAND CRIMINAL INJURIES COMPENSATION BOARD, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT (1969) (Case summary 42-D-69)).
63. Only five states-Alaska, Arizona, Minnesota, Oregon, and Texas-have abol-
ished the household exclusion from their victim compensation programs. LEGISLATIVE
DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 2.
64. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(b) (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.050(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.1809(B)(3)(c) (West
1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 5(b)(2) (1987); MO. ANN. STAT. § 595.020(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-9-125(2) (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15B-11(a)(3)
(1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-25-6(c) (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1220(2) (Law.
Co-op. 1985); W. VA. CODE § 14-2A-14(c) (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. § 949.08(2)(c) (1982);
WYO. STAT. § 1-40-106(b) (Supp. 1989).
65. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 3.
66. Id.
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Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) of states that have abol-
ished the drunk driving exclusion, less than five percent of the total
compensation claims filed were related to drunk driving crash vic-
tims. 6 7 The majority of states currently permit such victims to re-
cover compensation. As of 1988, thirty-six states had abolished the
drunk driving exclusion.68
Some state victim compensation programs contain "financial
means" provisions. These provisions generally require that a victim
must fall below a certain income bracket or demonstrate legitimate
financial hardship as a prerequisite to recovering victim compensa-
tion.69 Such a provision unfairly discriminates against victims who
cannot satisfy the financial need test, but who still require financial
assistance to pay for medical services or property damage resulting
from the criminal act.70 Since 1984, only two states, New York and
Texas, have modified or eliminated the financial need requirement in
their programs.71 Nine states, however, continue to enforce financial
67.0 Id The study also revealed that less than 10% of the total compensation
awards are given to drunk driving crash victims. Id
68. See id Since the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 was enacted, nine states have
repealed the drunk driving exclusion. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 34.
69. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(d)(1) (1985). The Kansas statute reads as
follows:
Reparations may be awarded only if the board finds that unless the claimant
is awarded reparations the claimant will suffer financial stress as the result of
economic loss otherwise reparable. A claimant suffers financial stress only if
the claimant cannot maintain the claimant's customary level of health, safety
and education for self and dependents without undue financial hardship.
I&.
70. See generally H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 61, at 271-72. One commen-
tator described the inequities associated with financial need tests as follows:
Such tests of financial need cannot be justified on either philosophical or prac-
tical grounds. ... If victims are to be compensated because they bear the bur-
den of society's failure to prevent crime, it makes little sense to compel them
to deplete their resources in order to qualify for benefits. If victim compensa-
tion is only another form of welfare, it is difficult to understand why victims
of crime should be favored over others also in need.... [Victim Compensa-
tion] Boards and their investigators have better uses for their time, energy,
money, and good will than conducting these essentially irrelevant probes into
the private affairs of crime victims.
Id.
71. In 1987, Texas amended its victim compensation program to eliminate the fi-
nancial need requirement. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309-1 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
In 1986, New York eliminated its financial hardship requirement for emergency
awards and designated awards under $2,000. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(6) (McKinney
Supp. 1989). Excerpts from past annual reports of the New York Crime Victims Com-
pensation Board indicate that a modification of the New York Financial need require-
ment was inevitable:
The most difficult problem [for the Board] still continues to be determining
the question of serious financial hardship. Many of the elderly people who
need provisions in their victim compensation plans.72
A minimum loss requirement is another controversial provision
often contained in compensation programs. Such a requirement typi-
cally provides that a victim may not recover compensation unless
losses exceed a certain amount--commonly $100 to $200-regardless
of the financial hardship. Since 1984, four states have modified or re-
pealed their minimum loss requirement.73 Conversely, in 1985, Mich-
igan legislators raised the state's minimum loss requirement from
$100 to $200.74 Compensation programs in nine states still contain
minimum loss provisions. 75
Although victim compensation programs are not flawless, the pro-
grams are an important step in providing for the needs of victims.
State legislators are refining and improving their respective pro-
grams, mostly prompted by the motivations provided by VOCA.
Even so, problems continue to exist in the form of administrative de-
lays and unnecessary and unfair restrictions on recovery.
4. Victim Notification Laws
Surveys indicate that the most important need for a victim during
the criminal justice process is the need to be kept informed of the
are retired, who have worked many years, have been frugal and have saved
money to take care of them in their declining years represent one group that
the Board feels should be reimbursed for their medical expenses. However,
the statute makes no distinction and, therefore, if they have substantial sav-
ings the statute does not permit an award to these elderly persons.
Another segment of our society is the middle income man who has supported
his family, has been gainfully employed and is not only a respectable but re-
sponsible citizen. This claimant feels that having been a law-abiding citizen
who has worked hard and paid taxes, he is entitled to receive his un-
reimbursed medical expenses and his loss of earnings within the limitations
allowed by the statute. The Board continues to feel that these two classes of
individuals should be compensated.
H. EDELHERTZ & G. GEIS, supra note 61, at 59 (citing FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
NEW YORK CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD 11 (1971)).
72. See FLA. STAT. § 960.13(7) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-7305(d) (1985); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.140(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1809(A), (B)(4)(6) (West 1982); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26A, § 12(f)(1) (Supp. 1988);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 18.361(5) (West Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1822(6)
(1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 217.220(5) (1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 631(6) (McKinney Supp.
1989) (New York's financial means test pertains only to awards of $2,000 and over). In
addition, the District of Columbia continues to have a financial means requirement.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-403(c) (1988).
73. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 346.130(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (elim-
inated $100 minimum); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46.1810 (West Supp. 1989) (permits
waiver of minimum loss requirement and eliminates minimum loss requirement if the
victim is over the age of 60); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-06(7) (Supp. 1987) (repealed $100
minimum loss requirements); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.015(1) (Supp. 1987) (reduced mini-
mum loss requirement from $250 to $100).
74. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 18.354(3) (West Supp. 1989).
75. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 3.
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status of the proceedings. 76 In many situations, however, the victim
is notified only when the victim's testimony is required. Conse-
quently, the victim remains ignorant of any additional facts concern-
ing events such as bail, plea bargains, or parole.
The Victim and Witness Protection Act, 77 enacted in 1982, required
the Attorney General to develop and implement a comprehensive
framework of victim notification requirements called the Guidelines
for Fair Treatment of Crime Victims and Witnesses.7 8 Under these
guidelines, federal officials must notify victims and witnesses of
scheduled changes in proceedings and, if a relatively serious crime oc-
curred, the time and place of all major proceedings in the criminal
process.
Since 1985, the number of states that have enacted comprehensive
victim notification laws has more than doubled. To date, forty-three
states have enacted laws which require public officials to keep vic-
tims informed of criminal proceedings. 79 The notification statutes
vary in their requirements. For example, some statutes provide for
notification before the event occurs, while others require notification
only after the event has occurred.
While it is important for the victim to be notified of the status of
76. See, e.g., J. HERNON & B. FORST, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE To VICTIM
HARM (Nat'l Inst. of Justice 1985); Hagan, Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim
Involvement in the Criminal Justice Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 317-
29 (1982). An issue of growing importance that is closely related to victim notification
statutes, but with potentially fatal implications, involves the rights of victims to be in-
formed if their offender tests HIV positive for the AIDS virus. See 4 NATIONAL VICTIM
CENTER, NETWORKS 6 (Sept. 1989). The U.S. Department of Justice Office for Victims
of Crime is in the process of completing a study to examine "the advisability of addi-
tional sanctions against people who have been convicted of drug offenses or sex crimes
who test HIV positive-people who knowingly, and willingly, expose others to the vi-
rus." Id. (quoting Dr. Jane Burnley, Executive Director of the Office for Victims' of
Crime).
77. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1512-1515, 3579-3580 (Supp. IV 1986) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)).
78. For a description of the guidelines, see United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp.
516, 520-25 (N.D. Ala. 1983), modified sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d
827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
79. Greengard, Crime After Crime, 15 BARRISTER 22 (Winter 1988). Most states in-
clude notification provisions in their comprehensive victim bill of rights statutes. See,
e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3 (Supp. 1988). State statutes differ as to when information
should be conveyed to the victim and how much information is required to comply
with the notice provision. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-253(4) (notify victim
of sentencing proceedings), 31-351 (notify upon release of defendant), 31-411 (notify of
release of defendant on parole) (Supp. 1988) with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-120 (notify
victim of plea bargain agreement), 81-1848 (notify victim upon final disposition of case,
schedule changes in proceedings, release of offender) (1985).
the victim's particular case, it is equally important that state officials
inform the victim of the existence and procedures of all applicable
victim assistance services.80 It is relatively common for the victim to
remain uninformed of available services, such as the existence of the
victim compensation program. A 1981 study revealed that in New
York, only thirty-five percent of all victims who reported crimes to
the police had heard of the compensation program.8 1 Although New
York law required the police to inform victims of available services,
only three percent of the victims surveyed stated that they were in-
formed of the compensation program by the police.82 As a result,
most states have recently enacted statutes requiring either police of-
ficers, hospital officials, or victim compensation officials to inform
victims or their dependents of the availability of assistance pro-
grams.8 3 Some states also require these officials to inform and edu-
cate victims on the application processes for the services.8 4
5. Victim Impact Statement Laws
Victim impact statements are reports by crime victims of the physi-
cal, psychological, and financial harm caused by the perpetrator's act.
In recent years, such statements have become one of the most contro-
versial topics in the area of victims' rights. The controversy centers
on whether victim impact statements should be used by judges or ju-
ries at the sentencing of the criminal offender. The victim's state-
ment usually takes the form of a report prepared by the probation
department85 and is presented to the court prior to sentencing. The
report's content varies, depending on the particular state and the
preparer of the statement. Many reports contain quotes from the vic-
tim or the victim's family members.8 6
80. See generally Anderson & Woodard, Victim and Witness Assistance: New
State Laws and the System's Response, 68 JUDICATURE 221, 229-30 (1985).
81. A PILOT SURVEY OF CRIME VICTIMS IN NEW YORK STATE 39-40 (1981), re-
printed in NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIMS COMPENSATION BOARD, THE CRIME VIC-
TIM AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE
LEGISLATURE ON THE STATE OF THE RIGHTS, NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF CRIME VICTIMS
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 625-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15B-20 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-3(9) (Supp. 1988).
84. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-1848(4)-(5) (1987); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 950.04(4)-
(5) (West 1982).
85. Although the usual practice is for a probation official to prepare the report,
several states require the victim to prepare the statement. See Young, A Constitu-
tional Amendment for Victims of Crime: The Victims' Perspective, 34 WAYNE L. REV.
51, 62 (1987).
86. See, e.g., Booth v. Maryland, 487 U.S. 496, 500 (1987) (describing victim impact
statement). For an extensive discussion of the various forms and contents of victim
impact statements, see McLeod, An Examination of the Victim's Role at Sentencing:
Results of a Survey of Probation Administrators, 71 JUDICATURE 162 (1987).
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As of 1988, forty-seven states permitted the use of a victim's impact
statement at sentencing.8 7 In addition, the Victim and Witness Pro-
tection Act amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to re-
quire pre-sentence reports to include victim impact statements.8 8
In 1987, the United States Supreme Court, by way of a 5-4 decision
in Booth v. Maryland,89 ruled that a Maryland statute was unconsti-
tutional because it required the use of victim impact statements at
sentencing. Booth involved the sentencing of a defendant convicted
of murdering an elderly couple. In accordance with the Maryland
statute,9 0 the probation office prepared a pre-sentence report contain-
ing a victim impact statement. The statement included interviews of
the couple's son, daughter, son-in-law, and granddaughter, along with
descriptions of the various emotional problems the family members
87. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 9; see Greengard, supra note 79, at
22. As of 1988, Alabama, Hawaii, District of Columbia, and New Hampshire still did
not allow victim impact statements. New Hampshire, however, expressly permits the
use of a victim "statement of opinion." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (1986). A state-
ment of opinion is a written opinion by the victim relating to the sentence to be or-
dered by the court. See generally LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 9. The
New Hampshire statute also permits victim "allocution," whereby the victim is al-
lowed to orally address the court at the sentencing hearing. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 651:4-a (1986).
88. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). Rule 32(c) was amended to read as follows:
Report. The presentence report shall contain:
information concerning any harm, including financial, social, psychological,
and physical harm, done to or loss suffered by any victim of the offense; and
any other information that may aid the court in sentencing, including the res-
titution needs of any victim of the offense.
Id. Several state courts have held that the evidence contained in victim impact state-
ments is relevant to a determination of the appropriate sentence to be rendered. See,
e.g., Sandvik v. State, 564 P.2d 20, 23 (Alaska 1977); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691,
740-42, 490 A.2d 1228, 1253-54 (1985), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 1078 (1986).
But see Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502-03 (1987) (holding that victim impact
statements are irrelevant to sentencing in capital murder case).
89. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
90. The Maryland statute stated:
(3) A victim impact statement shall:
(i) Identify the victim of the offense;
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense;
(iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense along with its seriousness and permanence;
(iv) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial rela-
tionships as a result of the offense;
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the vic-
tim's family as a result of the offense; and
(vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense
upon the victim or the victim's family that the court requires.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 41, § 4-609(c)(3) (1986).
suffered as a result of the murders. 91 At trial, the court overruled
the defense counsel's objection that the statement was irrelevant, and
the statement was read to the jury. After deliberation, the jury re-
turned the death sentence. The Marylard Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction. 92
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals' deci-
sion and held that the eighth amendment prohibited a victim's state-
ment in a capital murder case.93 The Court, noting that a jury's
proper focus should be solely on the defendant, held that the state-
ment was irrelevant because it impermissibly focused on the victim's
character and reputation and the effect of the crime on the victim's
family.94 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, concluded that the
statement should not have been admitted into evidence because it
"creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may im-
pose the death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner."9 5
In persuasive dissent, Justice White argued that the statement
should have been admissible because the jury was entitled to hear all
testimony regarding the degree of harm caused by the defendant's ac-
tions.96 Justice White further asserted that a complete description of
the harm the murder caused to the victim's family is relevant in de-
termining the defendant's blameworthiness.97 Although the Court
expressly limited its opinion to the use of victim impact statements in
a capital sentencing hearing, the decision was viewed by many com-
mentators as an unfortunate setback for the victims' rights
91. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499-500 n.3.
92. Booth v. Maryland, 306 Md. 172, 507 A.2d 1098 (1986), vacated in part and re-
manded, 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
93. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
94. Id. at 502-03.
95. Id. However, the Court went on to say:
Our disapproval of victim impact statements at the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal case does not mean, however, that this type of information will never be
relevant in any context. Similar types of information may well be admissible
because they relate directly to the circumstances of the crime. Facts about the
victim and family also may be relevant in a non-capital criminal trial.
Id. at 507 n.10. The Court's opinion further states:
We note, however, that our decision today is guided by the fact death is a
"punishment different from all other sanctions," . . . and that therefore the
considerations that inform the sentencing decision may be different from
those that might be relevant to other liability or punishment determinations.
At least 36 States permit the use of victim impact statements in some con-
texts, reflecting a legislative judgment that the effect of the crime on victims
should have a place in the criminal justice system .... Congress also has pro-
vided for victim participation in federal criminal cases.... We imply no opin-
ion as to the use of these statements in noncapital cases.
Id. at 509 n.12 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 515-19 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined in his dissent by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Scalia. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 516 (White, J., dissenting).
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movement.98
6. Victim Participation Statutes
Surveys indicate that victims are extremely dissatisfied with their
level of participation in the criminal justice system.99 A report pub-
lished in 1984 determined that fifty-nine percent of the victims sur-
veyed felt they should have been allowed greater participation in the
court process.10o Additionally, a National Institute of Justice study
found that victims obtain a significantly increased level of satisfaction
with the criminal justice system when they are afforded a higher
level of participation in the system. 10
In recent years, state legislators, perhaps influenced by the numer-
ous studies and efforts by victims' rights advocates, have extended
the degree of victim involvement in every stage of the criminal jus-
tice process. The following is a brief summary of legislative progress
in the area of victim participation.
a. Plea Bargaining
It is a common practice in criminal law for the defendant to enter a
guilty plea as a result of plea bargaining. 10 2 Negotiation sessions be-
tween the prosecutor and defense counsel are often the most impor-
tant proceeding in the criminal process.103 During these bargaining
sessions, the prosecutor freely chooses to drop or reduce charges
against the defendant. 104 Although the necessity and sometimes
98. See, e.g., Recent Development, Constitutional Law: Victim Impact Statements
and the Eighth Amendment-Booth v. Maryland, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 583
(1988); Comment, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth
Amendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing Phase of
Capital Murder Trial-Booth v. Maryland, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1159 (1988). But see Com-
ment, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Eighth Amendment Pro-
hibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence at Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder
Trial-Booth v. Maryland: Another View, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 1175 (1988) (decision was
based upon"sound constitutional principles").
99. See, e.g., Hagan, supra note 76, at 328-29.
100. Kelly, Delivering Legal Services to Victims: An Evaluation and Prescription,
9 JUST. Sys. J. 62, 73 (1984).
101. J. HERNON & B. FORST, supra note 76.
102. See J. BOND, PLEA BARGAINING AND GUILTY PLEAS § 1.07(2), at 13 (1978). Ap-
proximately 90% of all criminal prosecutions are disposed of by guilty pleas. Inter-
views with Thomas A. D'Amore and Patrick T. Kirlin, Assistant District Attorneys,
Dallas, Texas (Jan. 22, 1989).
103. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
104. Plea bargaining may be defined as any process whereby, in exchange for a
guilty plea, a prosecutor agrees to either: (1) charge a crime less serious than the facts
questionable motivations underlying the plea bargaining process are
beyond the scope of this article,O5 it is important to realize that the
victim has a vital interest in the outcome of the bargaining session.
Despite the potential impact of the plea bargaining process on the
victim, statutes permitting the victim's participation in the process
were virtually nonexistent until the early 1980s. By 1988, however, at
least twenty-one states had enacted laws requiring the prosecutor to
consult with or to notify the victim regarding the plea bargaining ne-
gotiations. 0 6 Thus, although the victim's opinion is never binding on
the prosecutor, the victim is effectively allowed to contribute to the
negotiating process.107
b. Court Attendance
Ordinarily, one might assume that the victim unquestionably
would have the absolute right to attend the trial of the defendant.
After all, such an assumption would be logical because the victim, as
a member of the general public, enjoys the right to attend any public
hearings, including criminal trials. Furthermore, the victim undenia-
bly has a substantial interest in the proceedings. Nevertheless, vic-
tims traditionally have not been permitted to attend and observe the
trial. A reason frequently given for the exclusion is that the victim's
presence may unfairly influence the jury.108 A more practical and ac-
curate reason, however, is that the victim is generally a testifying
witness in the case. As a basic rule, the only time a witness in a
criminal trial is permitted in the courtroom is during the witness's
may warrant; (2) reduce or dismiss a charge already issued; (3) not issue additional
charges; or (4) make a sentence recommendation. Fine, Plea Bargaining: An Unneces-
sary Evil, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 615, 616 (1987).
105. Plea bargaining is one of the most controversial topics in the area of criminal
law. See, e.g., Fine, supra note 104; Foley, Plea Bargaining is: No Bargain!, 64 MICH.
B.J. 505 (1985); Smith, The Plea Bargaining Controversy, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 949 (1986). For an in-depth view of the plea bargaining process, see Weninger, The
Abolition of Plea Bargaining: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 35 UCLA L.
REV. 265 (1987).
106. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-253(4) (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-203(g) (West Supp. 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.001(e) (West 1985 & Supp. 1989);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1404 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-5 (Burns
Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.756 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 611A.03 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 557.041 (Vernon Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-24-104 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-120 (1985); N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-
44(b) (West Supp. 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-24-5(C) (1987); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 647
(McKinney Supp. 1989); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-34-02 (Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 180-9.3 (Purdon Supp. 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 180-9.3 (Purdon Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-28-4.1 (Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(C) (Law.
Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-7-8 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-7-206
(1988); W. VA. CODE § 61-11A-6 (1989).
107. See generally Heinz & Kerstetter, Pretrial Settlement Conference: Evaluation
of a Reform in Plea Bargaining, 13 L. & Soc'y REV. 349 (1979).
108. See LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 18.
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own testimony.1 09 This rule of exclusion is intended to guard against
fabrication and to ensure independent testimony. 110 As a result, the
victim, as a testifying witness, is often excluded from the trial.
The Federal Rules of Evidence recognize three exceptions to this
rule of exclusion."' First, a witness is permitted to attend trial if
also a party to the action.1 12 Second, a witness is allowed to attend if
designated as a representative of an entity which is a party to the
case.1 1 3 The last exception involves a witness "whose presence is
shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party's
cause."11 4 Because the victim is not a designated party in a criminal
trial nor a representative of a party, only the last exception would
seemingly permit the attendance of the victim. The victim is often
the principal, and sometimes only, witness for the prosecution. Thus,
one can logically assume that such a witness's presence would be "es-
sential" to the presentation of the prosecutor's case.115
In 1983, Alabama passed the initial state "court attendance" stat-
ute.1 16 Such statutes generally grant the victim a conditional right to
attend all proceedings and exempt the victim from the witness exclu-
sion rules. As of 1988, fifteen states had enacted court attendance
statutes.
17
c. Parole Proceedings
The current overcrowding of the prison system has had a signifi-
109. FED. R.' EvID. 615. See generally 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1837-1842
(Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
110. J. WIGMORE, supra note 109, at § 1838.
111. FED. R. EVID. 615.
112. Id at 615(1).
113. Id at 615(2).
114. Id. at 615(3).
115. See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Edinborough, 625 F.2d 472, 474-76
(3d Cir. 1980) (allowed victim and victim's family to stay in courtroom); Dunn v.
Alaska, 653 P.2d 1071, 1086-87 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (held victim to be a person whose
presence in the courtroom was essential to presentation of prosecutor's case); Ne-
braska v. Eynon, 197 Neb. 734, 738, 250 N.W.2d 658, 661 (1977) (permitted victim to stay
in courtroom).
116. ALA. CODE §§ 15-14-50 to -57 (Supp. 1988).
117. See id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102.6 (West Supp. 1989); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-
1703.1 (Supp. 1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 620 (1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 780.761 (West Supp. 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-36-5(2) (Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 31-24-5(C) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 12.1-34-02(11) (Supp. 1989); OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.385 (1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1530(c)(8) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. § 19-14-29 (1987); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 56.02(b) (Vernon
Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.69.030(9) (Supp. 1989); ARK. R. EVID. 616; N.H.
R. EVID. 615; UTAH JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES--RULE ON VICTIMS & WITNESSES.
cant effect on the criminal justice system. Present-day convicted
felons are less likely to face imprisonment or to receive a maximum
sentence. Furthermore, because early parole has become a common
practice, felons are less likely to serve a full sentence under state
custody.
Thus, the victim has an understandable interest in the parole deci-
sion-making process. Currently, thirty-eight states have enacted stat-
utes permitting the victim to participate in some manner during the
parole hearing.11s Approximately twenty of these states have en-
acted their statutes since 1985.119 In most of these states, the victim
is allowed to prepare a statement describing the background and cir-
cumstances of the criminal offense, including a description of the in-
juries caused by the perpetrator. Furthermore, approximately thirty-
one states allow the victim to actually address the parole board at the
hearing.120
Parole hearings normally are closed to the public. In 1982, how-
ever, President Reagan's Task Force on Victims of Crime recom-
mended that parole hearings be made open to the public.121
Additionally, since 1982, at least seven states have enacted statutes
which effectively require public parole hearings.122
7. Victim Intimidation
A study completed in 1981 revealed that up to forty-eight percent
of all complaining victims are threatened by the defendant or others
on the defendant's behalf.123 In 1980, the Criminal Justice Section of
the American Bar Association prepared a model statute confronting
victim/witness intimidation. State legislators soon responded to the
problem by enacting intimidation statutes. Many of these early stat-
utes, however, made it almost impossible for law enforcement agen-
cies to arrest the offender or otherwise protect the victim/witness.
Most statutes required an excessively high level of proof that intimi-
dation or threats actually occurred, and many required that a crime
118. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 11.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5.
122. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 11-12.
123. Hudson, supra note 10, at 53 n.146 (citing VICTIM SERVICES AGENCY, WITNESS
INTIMIDATION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY'S RESPONSE
(1981)). The 1981 study revealed that victim/witnesses routinely were confronted with
gestures, verbal threats, notes, phone calls, destruction of property, display of weapons,
and physical attacks. Id. at 54 n.151. Approximately 70% of the threats occurred at
the victim's home or place of work. Id. In felony cases, 26% of the threats occurred at
the courthouse. Id. Furthermore, these threats were carried out in 25% of the cases.
Id. An even more startling fact is that police officials made arrests in only 3% of the
220 reported intimidation cases.. I& at 54 n.152. The police made no response to the
reported act of intimidation in approximately 23-38% of the cases. Id.
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actually be committed in furtherance of the threat. These ineffective
statutes led to a generally inadequate response by investigators, law
enforcement agencies, and prosecutors. 124
Recently, however, state statutes have been refined in an attempt
to remedy the problem of victim intimidation. As of 1988, forty-six
states had enacted legislation to protect victims against intimidation
and threats. 125 Many of the statutes allow a judge to issue a protec-
tive order similar to the temporary restraining order used in domes-
tic violence situations.126
8. "Son of Sam" Laws
In 1977, a series of murders took place in New York City over a
period of several months. The media repeatedly referred to the
killer as "Son of Sam."12 7 After the murderer, David Berkowitz, was
captured and convicted, the crime became the subject of numerous
articles and interviews. Berkowitz's notoriety eventually led to a
book contract between Berkowitz, an author, and a publisher.
As a result of the "Son of Sam" scenario, and others like it, forty-
two states128 enacted laws to prevent convicted criminals from profit-
ing financially at the victim's expense. "Son of Sam" statutes typi-
cally provide that royalties owed to the criminal pursuant to a
contract with a publisher, author, or other media representative must
instead be available for victim restitution, reimbursement of prosecu-
tion costs, and contributions to state crime victim compensation pro-
grams. However, if criminal charges against the accused are later
dismissed, the statutes normally provide that the accused shall re-
ceive all of the funds under the contract.129
124. Id. at 54.
125. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 15.
126. See generally VICTIM/WITNESS LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW 11 (U.S. Dept. of
Justice 1984).
127. See Winfrey, "Son of Sam" Case Poses Thorny Issues for Press, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 22, 1977, at 1, col. 1. The press used the term after a note signed "Son of Sam"
was discovered at the scene of a murder. Id.
128. LEGISLATIVE DIRECTORY, supra note 13, at 15. As of 1988, the only states that
had not yet enacted such a statute were Maine, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See id. at 15-16.
129. See generally Snider, My Life of Crime: Coming Soon to a Theater Near You, 7
CAL. LAW. 28 (Apr. 1987); Note, Criminals Selling Their Stories: The First Amendment
Requires Legislative Reexamination, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1331 (1987); Note, Crime
Doesn't Pay: Authors and Publishers Cannot Profit From a Criminal's Story: Fasching
v. Kallinger, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 831 (1987).
III. CONCLUSION
In the last five years, victims and their advocates have witnessed
numerous changes in the area of victims' rights. States finally are
taking the initiative by building the foundations of a system which
will eventually treat victims of crime with the compassion and re-
spect they deserve. State and federal legislators have made great
strides in the areas of victim compensation, notification, and partici-
pation. The basic legislative framework evolving in each of these ar-
eas generates optimism and, after minor renovations are made in the
future to resolve practical difficulties and to refine procedures, the
system should become quite effective.
Many problems, of course, still exist and continue to plague vic-
tims. One of the major flaws in the current legislation is that the vic-
tim is rarely given any means to enforce the "rights" granted by
statute. The entire system is predicated on the government agencies'
timely cooperation in providing effective assistance for the victim. If,
however, the agencies' assistance is neither timely nor effective, the
victim generally is left without a remedy. Thus, while the statutes do
grant rights to victims, they fail to provide a means of enforcing
those rights.
In his Crime Victims Week Proclamation Ceremony in 1981, Presi-
dent Reagan described victims of crime as the "forgotten persons of
our criminal justice system."130 Fortunately, his description is no
longer completely accurate. Society has demanded a response to the
needs of victims and, in recent years, federal and state officials are
finally recognizing and responding to those needs.
130. Crime Victims Week 1981, 3 C.F.R. § 18 (1982).
